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THE OVERARCHING THEME OF THE CONFERENCE in November 2001 wasdirected toward the evaluation and delivery of health care services.We ask
about the quality of health care: can we afford it? And can we identify it? Most
discussions of the quality of care emphasize its immediate determinants, such as
the kinds of protocols or tests that should be adopted in response to particular
conditions. Thus, the Institute of Medicine’s publication Crossing the Quality
Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (2001) has defined quality as
“the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the
likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with the current pro-
fessional knowledge.” This definition entails an emphasis on matters of short-
term delivery of health care, relative to competent technique, shared decision-
making, and cultural sensitivity. Often the key questions ask about the underuse
of certain needed procedures (e.g., vaccinations) or the overuse of others (e.g.,
antibiotics).
There is little that any lawyer can say sensibly about the design of professional
medical standards. But the influences on health care are indirect as well as direct,
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and this paper will focus on the indirect influences.As the title of the conference
suggests, issues that relate to the quality of health care go beyond the immediate
matters of health care protocols to larger questions of system design and organ-
ization, and the impediments that these might place in the path of quality health
care. Furthermore, the question marks in the conference title reveal a widespread
skepticism about our collective ability to solve these structural problems.
The standard drill when addressing such issues takes a familiar two-step form,
and has been applied to such markets as agriculture, education, and housing, to
name only a few.We start our analysis by positing a universe with hothouse con-
ditions that are ideal for the emergence of rational markets, and then we relent-
lessly show how these conditions are not, and cannot be, satisfied. Our myopic
remedy usually calls for the infusion of additional cash into the sector that we
champion—here health care—with scant regard for the dislocations that these
funding decisions will have on those activities exposed to the new taxes, or on
those rival activities that do not receive an infusion of funds equal to that com-
mitted to the preferred activity. It is all too common to ignore the “excess bur-
den” associated with all taxes—the reduced output that comes when certain
activities are foregone because the consumer pays more than the producer
receives (Gwartney and Stroup 1987, pp. 110–11).The tax increment will pre-
sumptively reduce the resource base. It is equally misguided to forget that selec-
tive subsidies will distort the relative prices of goods and services that should
compete with each other on level ground. Finally, it is wrong to assume that we
can form any social consensus on which activities should be benefited and which
should be taxed. The political infighting could easily exhaust any subsidy that
might be provided.
However, whatever its political dangers, I think that the first part of this two-
step approach works methodologically. Begin with the idealized universe, and
then ask whether it offers a benchmark for evaluating the imperfect institutions
with which we inevitably work.What to do then requires more consideration,
because the second half of the problem is equally important. Given the con-
straints that we face, what compromises do we make with the ideal? Which un-
happy outcomes are we prepared to accept in one arena in order to improve out-
comes elsewhere? To see how the process often goes and should go, let us start
with the idealized model and then examine the extent to which it survives more
real-world assumptions.
Idealized and Realistic Models
Idealized models are always risky because they are artificial.Yet these models are
always necessary because they illuminate relationships that would otherwise be
too complex to understand. A proper analysis, I believe, combines the ideal and
the real as follows. First, one identifies the assumptions of the ideal model, and
then one sees what happens when these are relaxed one at a time. Our ideal
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model embodies a number of assumptions.We assume, first, that we can embed
this particular activity or market in a larger universe that operates efficiently. In
some cases it is sufficient that transactions in adjacent areas are conducted on a
rational basis. But in other cases we need make only the weaker assumption that
any identifiable defects are confined to their own sphere (market or govern-
ment), without negative spillovers onto the area under study.This assumption has
the happy consequence of allowing us to do a partial equilibrium analysis.
Second, our ideal structure envisions situations with many individuals on each
side of the market, so that voluntary pairing of, for example, buyers and sellers,
yields strong gains to all parties, without having to escape the dark cloud that
monopoly casts over voluntary arrangements.Third, we assume that all individ-
uals have sufficient knowledge to act rationally on their own behalf and thereby
avoid the pervasive conflicts of interests that characterize principal-agent rela-
tionships (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Our rational actors can search the other
side of the market before making their ultimate choices. Fourth, we assume that
the market participants are competent to deal with the technical issues they face.
Finally, and more doubtfully, we assume that all individuals have sufficient wealth
to be effective market participants. Large differences in wealth do not undercut
the essential logic of markets, which rests on the ability to obtain mutual gains
through voluntary exchange no matter what the initial endowments of the par-
ties (Epstein 1997).Yet by the same token, political intervention into markets
becomes more likely the greater the disparities of wealth, and the greater the
perceived essential nature of the services supplied. By these standards, health care
becomes an obvious target for state intervention.
Let us now start with an ideal world with a sound external environment, mul-
tiple competent players, full information, and a rough equality of resources that
meets with general social approval. Under these conditions, the price and qual-
ity of health care would be “ideal” and, by and large, would be perceived as such.
Given those high levels of satisfaction, we would not observe any groundswell
for government regulation or private reform. It is not that everyone in the sys-
tem would choose to buy the best health care available at any cost, any more than
all people would choose to buy the fanciest car or the finest cuisine; an omni-
present wealth constraint (that is, the inevitable scarcity of system-wide resources
that no egalitarian vision can remove) ensures that people will optimize relative
to their budget.Thus no one should mandate some minimum dollar figure for
health no matter what other needs present themselves. More concretely, in this
environment, budget constraints would make it a mistake for people to rank
health care first in their market basket of goods. The better course of action
would be to make sure that the last dollar spent has the greatest marginal value.
It might be wiser for people to purchase goods and services that would help
them steer clear of the disease and injury that trigger the need for health care
services in the first place. Rational people would avoid deluxe health care that
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came at the cost of, for example, substandard housing. Accordingly, we expect
some individuals would gamble by leaving some conditions untreated or under-
treated. Those same people would be likely to express ex post regrets at their
decisions, even if these were rational (i.e., maximized expected value) when
made.Yet the robust condition of the overall voluntary health care market would
keep these isolated complaints from dominating the political debate over the
quality of health care.
Clearly, health care markets in practice do not display this level of vigor. Quite
the opposite—why else is the public estimation of health care services so low?
Kenagy, Berwick, and Shore (1999) write: “If banks, airlines, maintenance com-
panies, financial services, package delivery firms, and hotels treated their cus-
tomers to levels of waiting, unanswered questions, inconvenience, and obscure
instruction that are the norm in health care, they would be unable to survive.”
The authors then proceed to describe the pitfalls in the operation of hospitals
and health clinics, most of which concern the simple mechanics of supplying
coherent forms, using adequate signage, offering adequate parking, and hiring
courteous people to answer the phones and give instructions. In a service-inten-
sive industry, these factors can detract from the overall level of patient and fam-
ily satisfaction, even if medical and surgical treatment is first-rate. Any overall
assessment of the current levels of health care is bound to be mixed, whether we
speak of HMOs or the more traditional forms of health care delivery (IOM
2001, p. 238). Nonetheless, all too often the non–health care services fall far
below the level of the basic health care provided, leading upper-income cus-
tomers especially to avoid these costly hassles and delays.
Part of the problem here is making the correct diagnosis. Anyone who has
eaten airplane food, read a computer manual, attended an inner-city school, or
waited in line at the post office knows that service businesses are hard to run—
period.Any differences in service levels are thus a matter of degree across indus-
tries and are subject to wide variation within industries. But that said, it would
be hard to gainsay the common perception that on average the quality of serv-
ices in health care seems to be lower than it is in most private industries, if not
necessarily lower than the quality of other government services. To the extent
that we look to private firms as the quality benchmark, the quality-of-care puz-
zle only gets deeper. If these firms have the levels of efficiency attributed to
them, then why don’t they (or their successful managers) invade en masse the
sacred precincts of health care services? This invasion is in fact possible. First,
firms with expertise could compete with the incumbents who lack the skills to
take on the routine portions of the health care business.Alternatively, health care
businesses could subcontract out some portion of their work to firms who have
expertise in collateral fields: food courts could displace hospital-run cafeterias;
hotels could provide room service to patients; parking facilities and janitorial
work could be farmed out as well. Indeed one suspects that this movement has
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already begun.Yet the perceived lag in health care delivery remains.What possi-
bly accounts for it? Much of the answer can be found by looking at how our
idealized assumptions break down.
Breakdowns in Health Care
Independence of the Private Health Care Market
At this juncture, it is useful to run through the assumptions about idealized
markets, starting with the assumption of the well-ordered behavior in adjacent
markets. All too often the debate over health care ignores the indirect but pro-
found influences these markets have on health care. What should be done, for
example, to counteract a monopoly condition in an industry that is a key sup-
plier or competitor to health care? We know that this monopoly will drive the
price of inputs away from the competitive ideal. But the size and extent of the
movement will be hard to detect, and the policy options available to actors
within the health care area are limited, owing to the difficulty of securing polit-
ical changes in someone else’s turf. But the adaptive response within the health
care industry is likely to be imperfect if the monopoly in some adjacent area is
not regulated or broken up, assuming that these alternatives do more good than
harm (Demsetz 1968). Health care is stuck with the collateral imperfections.
Nor is the field able to escape the complexities of regulation in adjacent sec-
tors. Every service component of hospital care is subject to extensive regulation
in the name of health and safety. Many of these regulations crimp the flexibility
of suppliers of ancillary services because of greater precautions that have to be
taken in the preparation of food for internal use, the need for high levels of air
purity, and so on.These constraints reduce the freedom and increase day-to-day
costs. However, hospitals must necessarily worry first about regulatory compli-
ance and only then about consumer satisfaction.
Next, other institutions loom large in influencing the levels of health care
quality. Until 1974 hospitals were exempt from the National Labor Relations
Act, but now unionization is allowed, and extends not only to ordinary staff
workers but to interns and residents as well (Boston Medical Center Corpora-
tion 1999).At one time, too, other forms of direct regulation of the employment
relationship were relatively limited. But today minimum wage, equal pay, anti-
discrimination, mandatory retirement rules, and the rest impact health care just
as they do other sectors in the economy. Although this regulatory regime does
not doom health care to inferior services, it may well have greater impact in this
sector relative to others: safety concerns with hospitals are obviously greater, for
example, and the high concentration of nurse’s aides and other low skill work-
ers make union issues important.Advocates for better health care cannot have it
both ways. A unionized workforce for medical personnel, support staff, and
back-end business of hospitals reduces management flexibility and increases the
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labor costs. It is therefore ironic that many critics of health care costs also sup-
port labor laws that contribute to the problem.
The question of adjacent distortions, however, runs deeper than this.There is
also the question of the structure of the entire medical care industry. Here two
of the dominant realities of the provision of modern health care are Medicare
and Medicaid, with their different target populations and their formidable regu-
latory tangles. Discussions of the quality of health care frequently speak about
the risk of the overuse, underuse, and misuse of medical resources in diagnosis
and treatment. At one level these allocation shortfalls are surely a consequence
of errors that are likely to creep into the health care system no matter what legal
regime governs. But a huge chunk of the problem comes from the incentive
structures that are created by public regulation.
The basic structure of Medicare, for example, insulates the health care con-
sumer from any information about the marginal costs of the consumption of
health care services (Epstein 1997). Huge portions of the cost of the system,
today in excess of three-quarters of its cost, are pushed back on to one form of
general revenue taxes or another, including of course the 2.9 percent Medicare
tax on earned income for all workers. In addition, the portions of Medicare that
are paid for by patients are paid in a front-end lump sum, so that extra con-
sumption does not trigger extra costs.The predictable, structural effect of the sys-
tem is to induce at the margin (i.e., with each additional unit) overconsumption
of the relevant service within the field, which it is difficult to counteract by non-
price mechanisms of service review.
This behavior exerts a profound effect, moreover, on the availability and use
of health care services for individuals who do not fall under the Medicare
umbrella.These consumers now face greater competition from individuals with
subsidized services, which reduces the range of services available to them and
increases the cost of those services that remain. Medicare compensation levels
(which are to some extent pegged to private compensation levels) in turn move
up with the increase of “reasonable fees” in the private sector. In the current
political landscape, it seems unrealistic to expect any major change in the provi-
sion of Medicare, except perhaps for some additional expansion in its coverage,
either by increasing the number of covered procedures or by reducing the age
or other eligibility requirements for the system.The increased quantity of med-
ical services demanded has a negative effect on their average quality.
These distortions are increased by the erratic coverage patterns that Medicare
provides for various goods and services. It gives first-dollar coverage for hospital
and physician services, but does not include any kind of a drug benefit.The obvi-
ous result, which is checked only in part by the availability of private insurance
for prescription drugs, is to skew Medicare patients toward physician and hospi-
tal care and away from drug therapy. Hospital stays with their concomitant costs
could easily be longer, and hence higher, than might otherwise be the case. It
might be a sensible reform to cut down on hospital and physician services in
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conjunction with comparable increases for prescription drugs. Thus a sensible
insurance regime might offer reimbursement for, say, 80 percent of hospital,
medical, and drug costs up to some pre-assigned limits, instead of providing 100
percent of hospital and medical benefits but none for non-hospital prescription
drugs. Although one has to be cautious, that new system could place a more
effective cap on the overall level of health care expenditures while reducing the
current distortions among the types of treatment that are given.
But it will not happen, at least in the short run.The current political climate
is too strong to tolerate any cut in any existing benefit for doctor or hospital
services. Accordingly, we are now faced with the unhappy choice of having to
decide whether greater resource misallocations come from the odd skew in the
current coverage—which does not track private plans—or from the infusion of
new funds for full (or even substantial) drug benefits without requiring offsets
elsewhere. The now distant economic boom of the late 1990s pointed toward
expanded coverage.The austerity and external difficulties of the present times—
defined as the post–9/11 era—seem likely to doom the major expansion of any
welfare program in the short run, as is evident in the way in which patient rights
legislation has languished in Congress.
The organization of Medicaid is different, but it too places a drag on the over-
all level of health care. Here the levels of care supplied are manifestly lower than
they are with Medicare. Even so, there is no present political support for a major
upgrading of the system: poor people do not form a critical component of any
winning political coalition. Parity between Medicare and Medicaid is not polit-
ically doable if it requires either a substantial leveling down (for Medicare) or a
substantial leveling up (for Medicaid).With Medicare, the critical policy question
stems from the overuse of subsidized services; with Medicaid it is more difficult
to decide what structural defect needs the most urgent attention. For anyone
who measures the need for medical care without regard to the ability to pay,
Medicaid looks like an under-provided system. But the risk of deviant behavior
by non-compliant patients (a topic that does not get much discussed in polite
company) makes reform more difficult: even a small fraction of wayward recipi-
ents can inflict extensive system-wide damage. Similarly, even in the vast number
of cases in which no deviant behavior is involved, any increased public subsidy
for health can easily be negated, at least in part, by changes in private behavior
toward riskier activities that in turn generate greater needs for health care.The
problem of social control is therefore more acute. Furthermore, median voters
will not support massive infusions of capital for programs in which they do not
participate (Cooter 2000).
In our two major public programs, we have problems of underuse, overuse,
and misuse in different proportions in different populations. None will be easily
cured. But the competition for resources within the voluntary system remains.
The private market must operate more inefficiently when surrounded by these
two large and immovable ancillary systems, because these systems draw away
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resources that would otherwise make their way into the voluntary market, and
the reduction in supply raises prices systematically.We cannot assume a separa-
tion between the two markets when the same individuals and institutions are
supplying the same types of services to two related programs.
Licensing laws, which are particularly strong in places like California and
Florida, create yet another barrier to competition. Ideally, we would have a
national market in which physicians (most of whom pass National Boards) could
be free to follow their older patients from cold to warm climates. But licensure
laws reduce the level of mobility and thus confer at least some limited amount
of monopoly power on those physicians who have already made it under the
wire in one of the lucrative, patient-rich jurisdictions. Other professions may
have similar geographical restrictions, but the restrictions are far less important.
For example, a lawyer licensed by any state can practice in any federal court;
transactional work does not require licenses in the particular state, at least if one
local lawyer (usually needed in any event) can sign the appropriate papers. Al-
though the effects are indirect, one cannot ignore the long-term influences: the
less mobile the physician pool, the less responsive health care providers can be to
quality-of-care concerns.
Thus far I have made it appear that all the external effects are negative, but
this too is a mistake. In many areas we have seen undeniable improvement in the
quality of health care services in large measure because of advances in technol-
ogy. I know little of the particulars, but even to an outsider it is evident that the
risks associated with the use of anesthesia have declined markedly in the last 25
years, and that much of this improvement stems from the comparative strength
of the large technology industry that has been able to bring forward a steady rate
and pace of technical innovations. In many ways, this research market has been
strengthened by the improvement of the venture capital markets, which do a
better job than a generation ago in assisting the transition from bright idea to
marketable product.The pace of innovation in the drug markets (and the speed-
ier FDA processes) also bears notice, because the improvement of these therapies
often allows the substitution of relatively safe drug treatment for more danger-
ous surgeries, as, for example, with peptic ulcers. All things considered, the rate
of medical innovations that comes from basic research has also improved radi-
cally as well. So the scorecard of the role of collateral markets and regulation is
hard to total up. On balance, the long-term struggle pits improvements in tech-
nology and innovations against regulatory imperialism, producing a confused sit-
uation that to this outsider looks something of a wash.
Competitive Market Structures
The second of our assumptions—large number of independent players on
both sides of the market—has become more dubious in health care markets of
late. Fifty years ago, the dominant form of practice was fee-for-service medicine.
Hospitals were more numerous, and the government was not the sole provider
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of medical care for large fractions of the population. Today, antitrust in health
care is big business (Sneed and Marx 1990).The ever-increasing concentration
in health services makes the monopoly question loom larger today than it did in
previous times.Yet the antitrust blunderbuss could easily interfere with certain
market efficiencies—for example, by making it more difficult for firms to share
safety data.This market does not look to be perfectly competitive, but structural
reforms are likely to be hard to come by.
Information and Competence
So we now come to the third and fourth of these external influences, which
are heavily intertwined: whether people are competent to assemble and digest
the information needed to make intelligent decisions about health care services.
At some level, problems of imperfect and asymmetrical information, like those
of conflicts of interest between various market participants, are pervasive across
markets. Difficulties in ascertaining needed information frequently drives indi-
viduals to enter into contracts with observable payoffs, even if they are less than
ideal. Many people think that net profits rather than gross receipts is the better
measure of the value of leased property, for example; yet it is far easier, and thus
far commoner, to tie percentage leases to receipts, which are more observable.
The inevitable trade-off between the validity and reliability of a measure often
requires the use of proxies for the real thing. This vexed relationship between
measurement and proxies arises in every market (housing, education, brokerage
services, etc.).
That said, the information problem is especially acute in health care markets.
First, the information that must be assembled is often hard to process. Second,
the individuals who are asked to process this information often suffer from pre-
dictable levels of individual incompetence. Most individuals suffer from both
cognitive limitations on how to process the information they receive, as well as
emotional distress in having to deal with novel and life-threatening conditions
to themselves and their families. Needless to say, people find it hard to gather ac-
curate information to choose the right physician or health care institution.What
is to be done?
Individual Supervision
Individual consumers can devise a number of strategies to respond to these
manifest deficiencies.The most obvious approach is to rely on help. In the eco-
nomics literature, this strategy is often spoken of as substituting an “agency”
problem (how to make sure that the person on whom you rely has your inter-
est at heart) for an information problem. But these two problems need not have
the same magnitude: a lot depends on the choice of the agent, and the checks,
both legal and informal, that can be exerted to constrain his behavior.When the
agent is a knowledgeable family member or friend, these conflicts of interest may
be kept at a minimum. But they increase for people who are socially isolated
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from a knowledgeable professional, or whenever some real scientific expertise is
needed. In some cases, internists fill a critical role by lining up the various spe-
cialists to treat a given patient, by monitoring their behavior, and by facilitating
their exchange of information with patients. No one can say that these ap-
proaches are foolproof.What can be said with some confidence, however, is that
the persistence of these practices suggests that the information risk removed is
greater than the agency risk assumed, which is all one can ask for in a world in
which incremental improvements are, of necessity, the norm.
Institutional Supervision
The desired help today does not come solely from other paid agents.The role
of the internet as a guarantor of health care is likely to continue to increase. It
has long been hard to separate out advice on whether to purchase services from
the services themselves.The mechanic who repairs cars has a built-in incentive
to recommend repairs.The same conflict arises when the physician who makes
the diagnosis stands to undertake the surgery needed to correct it. Before the rise
of the internet it was expensive to track down independent sources of informa-
tion. Today on-line services and chat groups offer other avenues to attack the
information problem and reduce the patient’s abject dependence on his or her
physician.With better information flows, patients and their families can partici-
pate proactively in treatment.The overall competence problem should become
less severe, allowing better solutions to the quality of care questions.
In many contexts, individual monitors are not enough. Good health care
requires systematic controls that are not initiated by individual patients. Much of
health care today is provided through employer health plans and similar groups.
Their selection and oversight of health care providers is critical for the overall
success of health care markets. Ideally, monitoring offers continuous overall assess-
ments of the quality of health care provided to plan members.To be functional,
such programs involve the creation of aggregate databases, uniform and compre-
hensive medical histories, and standard protocols of treatment and assessment.
The effort to acquire and use system-wide information creates a conflict be-
tween the discretion of the individual physician (who has knowledge of the
peculiarities of the case) and the health plan officials (who have better knowl-
edge of the overall base rates). Adequate treatment requires the integration of
information from both sources; yet no one knows whether the plan, with its bet-
ter databases, or the management team, with its more accurate information,
should be in the driver’s seat in charting the course in difficult cases. Systems of
divided control are inherently awkward; systems of unitary control cut out or
downplay one source of information. Both defects are substantial and reciprocal:
one cannot be cured unless the other is exacerbated. No one claims to be able
to identify the proper mix of control, but it is clear that control has slipped away
from physicians and toward plans, and will continue to do so (Epstein 1999).
It should be no real surprise, therefore, that the organization, presentation, and
use of information about patients and treatments is difficult even for a single
(nationwide) employer, with respect to the multiple health care plans it must
supervise, or with hospitals and health care groups that supply similar services to
a broad base of clients. It is still more difficult to make assessments across employ-
ers or health care providers when it is far from certain that the information
obtained has been organized and analyzed on an apples-to-apples basis. Do we—
or better, how do we—control for age of population, income effects, national
origins, geographical variables, and the like? The point here is of no small con-
sequence, given the reluctance of individual health care providers to join in
comparative ratings.The charitable explanation is that the rating systems are fun-
damentally flawed, so that the use of tabular information simply misrepresents
more than it reveals. The suspicious explanation is that low-performing firms
have every incentive to conceal their shortcomings.
The Leapfrog Model
In an ideal world, we should strive to overcome all these difficulties of measure-
ment before making any judgments about the quality of health care. But the
informational demands of the continuous supervision model are at this point
beyond the capacity of any single individual or firm to implement. A different
tack is needed altogether. I shall take a leaf from the Leapfrog Group (2002) and
explore the possibility of a different strategy for assuring the quality of care that
may work, at least in the short run. Stated simply, the appropriate attitude on this
question is this: pick the low-hanging fruit first and worry about the fine points
later.
To see how the principle plays out, it is useful to begin with a quick aside
about the law of medical malpractice. Anyone who reads the reported cases on
medical malpractice must assume that the fundamental difficulty within the field
comes from policing the distinction between negligence in treatment and unfor-
tunate outcomes from proper care (Hirahara v.Tanaka 1998; Lama v. Borras 1994).
But we must recall the basic principles that govern the “selection” of cases for
litigation—that is, the nonrandom processes that indicate which cases get settled
and which get litigated (Priest and Klein 1984). Easy cases on liability one way
or the other are quickly settled, and thus never grace the appellate reports. But
easy cases also constitute the huge bulk of ordinary medical malpractice. Huge
damage awards can arise in complex surgeries because of a routine error in blood
typing. Simple errors kill in unambiguous ways.
This melancholy fact offers a profound lesson that should shape much of the
debate over the quality of care.The first line of attack is not to try to make case-
by-case assessments of quality. It is to do exactly the opposite. It is to break down
complex cases into simple processes and then make sure that those processes are
soundly executed. In effect, the first objective with respect to quality control is
to make sure that ambitious plans are not submarined by small failures.Thus in
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the work of the Leapfrog Group for Patient Safety, the first task is to figure out
a way to automate the delivery of routine health care services, such as physician
prescriptions.The point of the exercise is to take one constituent of undeniable
relevance with respect to complex treatments and make sure that errors in its
execution are reduced to a minimum by using standard forms and templates that
allow orders to be checked and reviewed for error. The point here is one on
which there can be little disagreement in principle, for it does not force anyone
to take sides on the thankless question of where discretion should be lodged in
the treatment of complex cases. Getting the simple points right forms a welcome
addition, no matter how those larger issues are resolved.
The consequences of this “simple” reform must be regarded as profound if it
could eliminate some 15,000 or so deaths per year. But programs like this require
a large investment in front-end capital even if they have low marginal costs, so
that the problem in many cases is to find ways to nudge managers into adopting
these precautions.That task is not easy even in a market system, if the front-end
costs have to be borne by hospitals who fear that after installation they will be
stuck with the full capital cost of the system while each user offers to pay for
(only) the marginal cost of its additional demands. So the structural problem is
how to persuade folks to design and implement these protocols.
The second approach is to find gross measures of quality that do not require
case-by-case supervision. In this regard, there seems to be widespread agreement
that hospitals and surgeons that perform procedures often perform them well.
Indeed, this one piece of information removes the need for having case-by-case
scrutiny of individual cases to make the ex ante decision of where and to whom
to turn. Providers need to ask various organizations to supply this information
and then to act on it.The worrisome side to specialization is that it can serve as
the handmaiden to monopoly, which carries with it the risk of inferior service
for patients and antitrust liability for health care providers. My own response to
this quandary is that ordinarily this will not be the case, for two reasons: first, the
pressures are market-driven in the best sense, so that it is hard to find any sys-
tematic intention or effort to form a cartel. Second, the more difficult the pro-
cedures, the greater the likelihood of finding variations in quality. Patients will
then seek access to national markets, so that the competition becomes in part be-
tween urban centers as much as it is within them.
Finally, the Leapfrog initiative proposes that specialty training be offered in
intensive care units, an issue on which I have much less knowledge and confi-
dence to judge. But, again, the strategy is to insist that the work be done, but not
to provide the blueprint by which it is done.
Having talked about the low-hanging fruit approach, several issues remain.
How does this strategy address problems associated with patient competence and
with differential levels of access to the health care system? On both these scores,
I think the approach comes off fairly well.The effort to develop standardized pro-
tocols for orders and to concentrate difficult cases in centers with extensive expe-
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rience is something that allows poorer and less informed consumers to piggyback
on the accumulated knowledge of the largest employers.The success of the sys-
tem depends on its inclusive nature; the trickle-down theory has some use, after
all. It also means that employees in large firms, even at the lowest level, gain some
degree of protection by virtue of having a strong intermediate represent them
when it matters most. Of course, some differentials in health care services sur-
vive: the CEO of a Fortune 500 Company will get better care than his ordinary
line workers. But much of this will be in non-medical benefits, such as private
rooms and shorter waiting times in hospital lobbies.The upshot is that I would
predict that the level of variation that one finds (top to bottom) in the provision
of critical health care services will be lower than that found in wages or other
workplace amenities. And that is just how it should be. Income is not a good
proxy for survival, and we should expect that even low-level employees will value
these benefits highly. It follows therefore that some (sensible) portion of the egal-
itarian movement in health care will be realized through market forces.
Access to Health Care
This analysis has important implications for the general question of access to
health care.The usual approach to this question is to find some way to provide
a state subsidy for lower-income people whose care falls below some socially
defined minimum.The costs of that strategy were mentioned above: the tax bur-
dens and political dislocations mean that improvements in health care for some
can only be achieved by imposing massive dislocations on others. Leapfrog and
other private initiatives suggest an alternative, but indirect, strategy for improv-
ing access to health care. Change the regulatory environment so as to reduce the
cost of health care for anyone who wants to buy it on the voluntary market.
Once those costs are reduced, more individuals will flock to health care, and they
will do so in an environment that avoids the twin risks of systems of subsidy and
taxation.
If this message is correct, then we should recognize that indirect causes can
have major impacts, negative as well as positive, on the quality of health care.
Every time the minimum wage law or some restrictive statute keeps a worker
out of the voluntary market, it cuts him off from the health care that this mar-
ket can provide. So the point is to grow all companies, so that the percentage of
people who cannot avail themselves of these new, system-wide advances shrinks.
Standardized procedures, supplied on a nondiscriminatory basis, clearly help
those who have limited competence as well as limited wealth, and for the same
reason: it is generally safer to piggyback on those who are more knowledgeable
than yourself than it is to strike out boldly in some uncharted direction.
In sum, I think that we can now state a reasonably coherent two-prong attack
on health care quality. First, at the macro level, reduce the barriers to entry and
other structural impediments to competitive markets.The comprehensive reduc-
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tion in general costs will free up more resources for the health care system and
will bring more people into the voluntary market. Next, dealing with the qual-
ity dimension, put the systematic effort into dealing with the nagging problems
of routine administration that free up other resources to deal on a case-by-case
basis with individual matters. Since we cannot repeal scarcity, nothing will
“solve” the problem of quality in health care. But much can be done to amelio-
rate its severity.
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